

Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political Geography of Consensus and Conflict

PETER TRUBOWITZ

University of Texas at Austin

For over two decades American foreign policy has been the subject of protracted conflict. Deep divisions exist over the uses of American power. This study argues that this conflict is regional in nature and is part of a larger struggle over national priorities between the nation's oldest and newest industrializing regions. Using Congress as a proxy for the national polity, I employ a spatial model to describe and analyze the regional bases of legislative voting over foreign policy. I show that since the late 1960s conflicts over foreign policy matters have pitted the "manufacturing belt" against the "sunbelt." I argue that this regional conflict goes a long way in explaining the difficulty America's political leaders have experienced in articulating a vision of the national interest that inspires broad domestic support.

Introduction

In most accounts of American foreign policy, sectionalism or regionalism is viewed as a relic of the past. Once assigned a prominent place in studies of foreign policy-making, sectionalism rarely figures into accounts of contemporary debates and conflicts over "the national interest." Students of American foreign policy remain reluctant to interpret the politics of recent controversies over the use of American power in regional terms. This reflects a widely accepted belief among foreign policy analysts that politics in the United States has become increasingly "nationalized." The regional struggles that shaped the debates over tariff policy, territorial expansion, and naval power in the nineteenth century are generally assumed to have gradually disappeared in the twentieth century with the closing of the national frontier, America's rise as a global power, and its integration into the world economy. Analysts have turned to the study of ideological and institutional cleavages at the national level to interpret and explain patterns of conflict, consensus, and stalemate over foreign policy.

Author's note: A number of people provided helpful comments and suggestions: Richard Bensel, Catherine Boone, Walter Dean Burnham, Paul Cammack, Gavan Duffy, Thomas Ferguson, Robert Keohane, James Kurth, Benjamin Page, Robert Vitalis, and Harrison Wagner. I would also like to thank Erik Devereux for his valuable assistance in the data collection and data analysis. The Center for International Affairs at Harvard University funded research time in the spring of 1991. The roll call data were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Is sectionalism an anachronism? In this paper, I argue that a closer look at the patterns of political conflict over foreign policy shows that sectionalism is alive and well. For over two decades American leaders have experienced great difficulty in articulating a vision of the national interest that inspires broad domestic support. Since the late 1960s, questions of foreign policy have been the subject of protracted political debate (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1983; Destler, Gelb, and Lake, 1984; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984; McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990). Most analysts argue that there was a consensus over foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s and that its breakdown was largely the result of the Vietnam War. There is no agreement, however, when it comes to explaining why recent administrations have been unable to forge a new consensus. I argue that a geographically based approach can shed new light on the difficulties American leaders have experienced in managing the nation's foreign policy. My main claim is that conflicts over foreign policy are grounded in a struggle between the nation's oldest and newest industrializing regions: the "manufacturing belt" and the "sunbelt."

My approach builds on a large literature in political geography on the role of sectionalism in the United States. A common theme in this work is that the national political economy is undergoing a fundamental process of change that can best be thought of in regional terms. Political geographers have shown that since the 1960s American politics has been shaped by a struggle for national wealth and power between states in the Northeast (the manufacturing belt) and states in the South (the sunbelt).¹ The crux of my argument is that this struggle between the manufacturing belt and sunbelt has found expression in conflicts over the nation's foreign policy. Since the late 1960s debates over foreign policy have pitted the Northeast against the South. Support for an ambitious and expensive foreign policy agenda has been strongest in the sunbelt. Politicians from the manufacturing belt have favored a more restrained and cost-conscious approach to foreign policy. I argue that this conflict over foreign policy is part and parcel of a larger regional struggle over national priorities. It reflects the regionally uneven nature of development in the national political economy.

The central empirical task in this paper is to show that the recent pattern of conflict over American foreign policy is regional in nature. When did this pattern of regional competition over foreign policy first emerge? How stable or durable has this regional cleavage been? These questions are addressed through an analysis of roll call voting in the House of Representatives. I treat the Congress as a proxy for the national polity and reconstruct patterns of regional conflict and cooperation from "key" congressional roll call votes on foreign policy. The core of the paper consists of a longitudinal or serial portrait of the voting alignments over foreign policy from the Truman through Reagan years. These data are used to identify foreign policy coalitions, uncover their regional bases, and pinpoint breakpoints in the structure of domestic competition over foreign policy. I show two things: first, that there was a realignment in congressional voting over foreign policy in the late 1960s, and second, that since that time elected representatives from the manufacturing belt and sunbelt have defined the nation's strategic interests and objectives in fundamentally different ways.

¹The manufacturing belt, or Northeast, is defined here as a region that spans New England, the Middle Atlantic, and the Great Lakes. The states in this region include Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. The sunbelt is defined here as a region spanning the Southeast and Southwest. It includes the following states: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Midwest comprises Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The West includes California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Since Alaska and Hawaii were not states during part of the study period, they were dropped from the data analysis.

Establishing three points at the onset will set the framework for the analysis. First, the historical scope of the analysis makes it necessary to use a unit of analysis that is stable over time. States are a logical choice for such purposes. The boundaries of legislative districts change; state boundaries do not. States are also important politically. States choose presidential electors and state delegations have long operated as "informal" institutions within Congress. Second, my decision to focus on the House, as opposed to the Senate, is largely one of analytic convenience. Since "states" are the unit of analysis, the size of state delegations in the House makes them more suitable from a methodological standpoint. Finally, I assume that elected officials are motivated by electoral imperatives, and that in pursuit of reelection they are responsive to prevailing economic conditions and political currents in their home states. This assumption is consistent with a large body of literature in American politics that views legislators as single-minded seekers of reelection.

Sectional Strife and Foreign Policy

Since the nation's founding, regional politics has played a prominent role in debates over foreign policy. This is particularly obvious in periods of flux. After America won its independence, the Northeast and South divided over how the new nation would use its powers (Varg, 1963; Lynd, 1970). The intense conflicts over foreign trade, American involvement in European affairs, and continental expansion found expression in debates over the scope of American participation in the world economy. Debates over American imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century were also shaped by regional rivalries between northern industrial and financial interests and southern agricultural and raw materials producers (Rystad, 1975; Bensel, 1984). This regional cleavage structured debates over the tariff, the modern Navy, and overseas expansion. Well into the twentieth century, regional strife continued to play a prominent role in debates over foreign policy (Grassmuck, 1951; Turner, 1966). In the wake of the Great Depression, the axis of conflict shifted along coastal-interior lines. The Midwest and West clashed with states from the Atlantic seaboard, the Gulf Coast, and the Pacific Rim over the White House's efforts to centralize foreign policy-making power and to stimulate and regulate American involvement in the world economy.

These moments of transition and flux in American foreign policy reveal a truth that is often obscured during times of stability and consensus: "the national interest" has a geographic dimension. During periods of consensus, when national leaders enjoy substantial latitude in conducting foreign policy, the domestic political circumstances that confer such authority on statesmen recede from view. Support for policy initiatives is sufficiently broad, and the policy-making process works with enough regularity, to permit analysts to speak about the national interest as though it were somehow suspended above politics. In times of crisis, this comfortable illusion about the foreign policy-making process dissolves and the inherently political nature of the national interest is revealed in stark form. We see the regional imperatives and alignments that make consensus over foreign policy possible in some periods and not in others. In each of these periods, issues of foreign policy were the subject of intense and protracted regional conflict. Regional fights took on strongly emotional and symbolic overtones. At issue were questions of relative gain—political as well as economic.

That questions of foreign policy should figure into regional struggles over wealth and power is not really surprising. Decisions over the nation's strategic goals, market orientation, and military posture are not geographically neutral. The late nineteenth century, for example, was marked by a struggle between the industrial

heartland in the Northeast and the agrarian hinterland of the South for political dominance and control over the national state. This regional conflict permeated both foreign and domestic policy issues (Burnham, 1981; Bense, 1984; Brady, 1988). The Republican "core" sought to extract tribute from the Democratic "periphery" in the form of tariffs for northern industry and pensions for Union veterans. At the same time, the Republican core sought to expand its political and economic power by colonizing foreign lands, modernizing the nation's military, and revising federal electoral laws. Elites from the periphery sought to limit the transfer of wealth and power to the core, and to limit the scope of northern control of the national political system, through strategic maneuver and political obstruction. Still chafing from the legacy of reconstruction and seeking alternative industrial markets for their goods, the periphery sought to limit the centralization of power at the national level and favored free trade instead of imperialism.

Sources of sectional strife in the United States are both economic and political. The regionally uneven nature of economic growth and development often means that the costs and benefits of national policies are spread unevenly across the nation. Regional political competition is the result (Turner, 1932; Key, 1964; Bense, 1984). The spatially decentralized structure of political representation in the United States heightens the role of territoriality in national politics by forcing politicians to organize on a geographic basis to compete for political power at the national level (Archer and Taylor, 1981). American party leaders have a long if inglorious record of playing on regional antipathies and sensitivities to mobilize electoral support and marginalize political opposition. The effects of federalism are compounded by the fragmented structure of the federal government itself. What some have defined as the inherent "weakness" of the American state provides regionally based groups and movements a large number of access points to exert political pressure and influence national policy-making (Duchacek, 1970; Beer, 1973; Paddison, 1983). Such groups and movements help define, shape, and articulate regional sentiments and mobilize regional interests for collective action.

It is surely no accident that past periods of flux and crisis over the nation's foreign policy coincided with shifts in the underlying distribution of regional power at the national level, the erosion of existing regional alignments in the party system, and acute political struggles between coalitions advancing conflicting regional agendas. In more recent times, political and economic geographers have seen the 1960s as a watershed, the beginning of another era of regional restructuring in the national political economy. Many volumes have been written about the decline of the nation's industrial heartland and the rise of the southern periphery, and the reemergence of sectional strife over domestic policy. In this paper, I show that this axis of regional competition and conflict has also surfaced in the area of foreign policy. As in previous periods of flux and transition, the current struggle over "the national interest" is structured along regional lines and grounded in conflicting sectional imperatives.

Research Design and Methods

My approach to American foreign policy builds on this regionally grounded approach to understanding national politics. I seek to show that the structure of domestic competition over foreign policy changed in the 1960s, and that since that time conflicts over foreign policy have pitted the manufacturing belt against the sunbelt. One way to test these propositions is to examine how members of Congress vote on foreign policy matters over time. For present purposes I analyze voting behavior in the House of Representatives from the Truman through Reagan years. Two different methods are used here to reconstruct and analyze congress-

sional voting behavior: principal components analysis and multidimensional scaling. Principal components analysis is used to identify temporal groupings of Congresses. Multidimensional scaling is used to identify geographical groupings of congressional or state delegations.

The data set consists of roll call votes defined as "key" votes by organizations that monitor political activity in Congress on a regular basis. These organizations include Americans for Democratic Action, Americans for Constitutional Action, and *Congressional Quarterly*.² Each group publishes an annual list of congressional votes on important national issues, foreign as well as domestic. These votes constitute a test of legislators' policy preferences and their positions on issues whose political significance is unlikely to be lost on elected officials. Votes used here cover a wide range of foreign policy issues. The overwhelming majority falls into the following categories: foreign trade, overseas investment, defense spending, military assistance, arms control, foreign aid, military alliances, military intervention, covert operations, international institutions, arms sales, and presidential powers. The data set includes all of the major foreign policy initiatives undertaken by a president that required approval by the House and votes on every major foreign policy issue that reached the House floor. All of the roll call votes included in the analysis were weighted equally.

The roll call votes were used to construct two different measures. The first measures support for Cold War internationalism. I define this concept as support for policies and programs designed to promote an open, interdependent world economy and isolate or "contain" the Soviet bloc. For each of the postwar presidencies (Truman through Reagan) a composite index was constructed using the key votes described above.³ A vote for any of the following was considered a vote in support of Cold War internationalism: free trade, overseas investment, economic aid, military aid, arms sales, military alliances, military intervention, covert operations, defense spending, international institutions, and presidential prerogative in the making of foreign policy. Votes against such initiatives, including votes for arms control, were treated as votes against Cold War internationalism. The position of each member of Congress on these votes was identified.⁴ A mean support score for Cold War internationalism was calculated by averaging across the votes. A state mean was then formed by averaging the scores of all members of a congressional delegation.⁵

The second measure is an index of voting similarity between congressional delegations. For each of the eight presidencies, voting similarity or agreement scores were calculated for all pairs of state delegations using a modified version of the

²The Americans for Constitutional Action began publishing an annual list of key votes in 1960. For the 1947–59 period, the roll calls selected by the Americans for Democratic Action and *Congressional Quarterly* were supplemented by those chosen by the *New Republic*. Since the Americans for Democratic Action was created in 1947, votes for the 79th Congress (1945–46) were drawn from *Congressional Quarterly* and the *New Republic*. I was unable to obtain key votes for the 99th Congress (1985–86) from the Americans for Constitutional Action. For this Congress, the list of votes from *Congressional Quarterly* and the Americans for Democratic Action was supplemented by those used by the *National Journal* in rating legislators.

³The analysis is based on key votes from 1945 through 1986 (i.e., the seventy-ninth through ninety-ninth Congresses). The following timeframes are used to classify the votes by presidency: Truman (1945–52); Eisenhower (1953–60); Kennedy (1961–63); Johnson (1964–68); Nixon (1969–74); Ford (1975–76); Carter (1977–80); Reagan (1981–86).

⁴Following convention, paired votes and announced positions were treated as formal votes.

⁵As noted earlier, the longitudinal nature of this study makes it necessary to use a unit of analysis that is stable over time. Hence the decision to use states as opposed to districts. Aggregating to the state level involves some cost in analytic precision. States are not completely homogeneous, economically, socially, or politically. In some states like California and New York that have complex economic and partisan profiles, there may be important policy differences at the district level that are lost by using the average state score. One should not, however, overemphasize this problem. In most cases, there was a relatively high degree of policy consensus within the state delegations. Moreover, I focus here on general tendencies within broadly defined regions.

pairwise agreement index. This index is normally used to measure voting similarity among individual members of Congress. Here, state delegations, not individual representatives, are the unit of analysis. Each state delegation's position on a vote was based on the majority position in the delegation voting yea or nay. The voting similarity index measures the percentage of agreement between each pair of state delegations over all of the key foreign policy votes during a presidency. The score is one hundred when there is perfect agreement between the majority positions of two state delegations; it is zero if there is perfect disagreement.

These two measures are used to capture different properties of House voting over foreign policy. A measure whose substantive meaning is relatively fixed or constant over time is used to determine whether the structure of political competition over foreign policy changed, and if so when. Principal components analysis is an appropriate technique for this purpose.⁶ It is used here to determine whether the structure of House voting changed in the late 1960s and early 1970s and to determine how stable House voting was in the 1970s and 1980s. In the principal components analysis, the presidencies are the variables and state delegations are the analytic units. If there were a realignment in House voting, then it will be apparent in the factor loadings of the presidencies. Multidimensional scaling is an appropriate method to analyze proximity structures such as legislative voting alignments and coalitions. Multidimensional scaling is used here to uncover the geographical alignment of state delegations at different points in time. Together, these methods produce a compelling portrait of voting patterns over foreign policy issues in the House.

Analysis of House Voting on Foreign Policy

The results of the principal components analysis are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The analysis points to a realignment in the structure of state support for Cold War internationalism. A relatively clear two-dimensional pattern is apparent, with the first and second dimensions collectively explaining 73.9 percent of the total variance in the data. Of that total, 52.3 percent of the variance is attributable to the first dimension and 21.6 percent is attributable to the second. A third dimension accounts for only an additional 9.3 percent of the variance. With the exception of the Reagan years, every presidency has at least 60 percent of the variance accounted for by the component analysis. During the Reagan presidency a substantial 58.4 percent of the variance is still explained. An examination of the factor loadings in the varimax rotation indicates that the pattern of state support for Cold War internationalism changes. The shift occurs during the Nixon years.⁷ The Truman,

⁶Other factor analytic procedures could be used. However, my purpose here is to show that the pattern of House voting is in fact highly structured, that the structure changed around the late 1960s and early 1970s, and that the new structure persisted into the Reagan years. Principal components analysis is an appropriate procedure to use for this purpose. In applying this technique, I start from the assumption that voting over foreign policy during the era of the so-called postwar consensus was relatively stable. The notion of a "consensus" itself captures the stability and durability of voting cleavages from the late 1940s into the early 1960s. Principal components analysis allows me to determine whether this structure gave way to another, similarly stable structure of voting. If it did not (i.e., if the post-1970 structure of House voting were based on random or short-term factors), principal components analysis would produce several components; collectively, these components would explain little variance. For a discussion of the appropriateness of principal components analysis for dealing with similar issues of structural change see Rabinowitz, Gurian, and Macdonald (1984) and Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1986).

⁷The precise timing of the change in House voting cannot be determined from the data presented here because I have aggregated Houses by presidency. A similar analysis was conducted House by House for the study period. The results are consistent with those described here. With respect to the realignment, the pivotal House appears to be the 91st (1969-1970).

TABLE 1. Summary of principal component analysis.

<i>Component</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Percent Variance Explained</i>	<i>Cumulative Percent Variance Explained</i>
1	4.187	52.3	52.3
2	1.729	21.6	73.9
3	0.745	09.3	83.2
4	0.516	06.4	89.6
5	0.354	04.4	94.0
6	0.227	02.8	96.8
7	0.152	01.9	98.7
8	0.089	01.3	100.0

Source: Based on recorded roll call votes in the United States Congress.

TABLE 2. Varimax rotated coefficients and variable communalities.

<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Loadings on:</i>		<i>Percent Variance Explained (100 x Communality)</i>
	<i>Dimension 1</i>	<i>Dimension 2</i>	
Truman	.318	.711	60.7
Eisenhower	-.295	.879	86.0
Kennedy	-.320	.800	74.3
Johnson	-.596	.686	82.6
Nixon	.818	-.052	67.2
Ford	.898	-.064	81.1
Carter	.875	-.216	81.2
Reagan	.739	-.196	58.4

Source: Based on recorded roll call votes in the United States Congress.

Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidencies load on the second dimension; the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidencies load on the first dimension.

The principal components analysis offers some support for the widely held view that the Vietnam War reshaped patterns of congressional voting over foreign policy. The shift in House voting during the Nixon years occurs at about the same time that Vietnam emerges as a major issue on the House floor. This issue has been discussed in some detail by Sinclair (1982) and Clausen (1973), both of whom have shown that a new cluster of foreign policy issues surfaced by the mid-1960s.⁸ They indicate that the range of issues that made up the House agenda in the 1970s was much broader than those under consideration before the escalation of the war in Vietnam. In the 1940s and 1950s, the legislative agenda was dominated by issues and votes pertaining to economic development in Europe and Asia, the reduction of international barriers to the movement of goods and capital, and the creation of military alliances and overseas bases. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new cluster of issues arose concerning cuts in defense spending, reductions in military aid and sales to the Third World, and executive discretion in the use of force abroad.

⁸Their studies are not strictly comparable to the present one. They rely on individuals, as opposed to states, as the unit of analysis; they use different criteria to select votes; and they employ a different methodology. Nevertheless, their studies of legislative voting raise an important issue that is relevant here.

My own reading of the key votes used in the present analysis squares with their conclusion. The composition of the votes changes over time as the proportion of votes dealing with national security issues, as opposed to foreign economic issues, increases. This process began in the late 1960s. As Sinclair and Clausen argue, this suggests that there is some "reorientation" in the nature of legislative voting in the foreign policy domain during this period. In my terms, what this implies is that new issues were pushed on to the House floor as the pattern of state support for the Cold War changed.⁹ The question is why? Can the shift or realignment in the pattern of state support for Cold War internationalism be understood solely in terms of the debates over national security policy that arose over the Vietnam War? Or was this realignment over foreign policy grounded in a more pervasive regional struggle over foreign policy? I deal with this question in the next section. First, however, it is necessary to provide a geographic breakdown of the pattern of voting described above and to determine the extent to which the domestic realignment over foreign policy is regional in character.

Multidimensional scaling is used to reconstruct and analyze the geography of House voting over foreign policy. The basic goal of this scaling technique is to describe the empirical relationship between some set of objects in a space of fixed dimensionality. Widely used in the field of psychology, multidimensional scaling is also now employed by political scientists. A number of analysts have demonstrated its utility for analyzing political attitudes and recovering legislative voting patterns (Weisberg, 1968; MacRae, 1970; Rabinowitz, 1975; Hoadley, 1980; Easterling, 1987). Here I use the simplest nonmetric version to provide a spatial display of the voting alignment among congressional or state delegations over foreign policy at different points in time. The states (i.e., state delegations) are represented as points in the space, and distance is an analog for similarity (or dissimilarity). The goal is to find the configuration of interpoint distances between state delegations that corresponds as closely as possible to the similarities among the voting behavior of these delegations.

A number of issues must be addressed in interpreting the results obtained through multidimensional scaling. First, the quality of a solution, or the fit between the data (voting agreement scores) and the configuration, must be determined. In the program used here, ALSCAL, the quality of a solution is defined by RSQ, which measures the degree to which the configuration reproduces accurately the relationships present in the data. Second, the appropriate dimensionality must be determined with respect to RSQ. In principle, a solution can be derived in any number of dimensions, and RSQ will be higher when a higher dimensionality is allowed. Since multidimensional scaling works in a space of fixed-dimensionality, it is necessary to determine the most appropriate dimensionality, recognizing that there is a trade-off between the quality of fit (high RSQ) and parsimony (a small number of dimensions). Finally, the interpretation of a configuration involves a search for meaningful patterns, usually defined as dimensions or clusters. While dimensional structure is often emphasized, it is equally valid to focus on clusters of objects in the configurations.¹⁰

The results of the scaling analysis are summarized in Table 3. Configurations were generated in one, two, and three dimensions. The two-dimensional configuration was selected as the best representation of voting patterns in each of the eight presidencies. On average, the two-dimensional solutions account for 94.3 percent of the variance. A third dimension improves the fit by only 2.2 percent on average.

⁹In other words, the change in the House agenda was itself a reflection of new cleavages in the Congress. See the interpretation of the results that is provided in the next section.

¹⁰For a good discussion of this issue see Kruskal and Wish (1978).


TABLE 3. Summary of multidimensional scaling solutions.

Presidency	RSQ Dimensions			STRESS Dimensions		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
Truman	.850	.926	.961	.225	.130	.084
Eisenhower	.808	.896	.936	.255	.148	.099
Kennedy	.846	.960	.978	.227	.096	.064
Johnson	.940	.984	.991	.146	.068	.047
Nixon	.843	.928	.957	.233	.130	.090
Ford	.944	.966	.979	.142	.094	.067
Carter	.854	.924	.948	.221	.133	.099
Reagan	.929	.966	.974	.156	.097	.077

Source: Based on recorded roll call votes in the United States Congress.

(ALSCAL also generates an alternative "badness of fit" function, known as STRESS, which is presented along with RSQ in Table 3.) In some cases, the one-dimensional configurations would be adequate on the basis of RSQ, but there is no particular advantage in restricting the figures to a single dimension. Since voting alignments are easier to visualize in a plane, the two-dimensional solutions are presented here. For present purposes, I limit the discussion to the voting patterns in the Truman, Nixon, and Reagan years (Figures 1 through 3). A detailed analysis of House voting during each of the postwar presidencies is not necessary to capture the regional properties of the realignment revealed by the principal components analysis. The Truman and Reagan years bracket the analysis historically; the Nixon map is used to highlight the regional bases of the realignment in House voting.


The vertical and horizontal dimensions in the three configurations are not labeled and are not interpreted here in terms of two orthogonal linear dimensions. A dimensional interpretation is appropriate in certain instances, but it does not provide the best description of the patterns in the figures. The configurations



Key: Manufacturing Belt Sunbelt Other

Source: Derived from multidimensional scaling of key roll call votes in the United States Congress: 1945-52.


FIG. 1. Voting Alignment on Foreign Policy Issues for Truman Years



Key: Manufacturing Belt Sunbelt Other

Source: Derived from multidimensional scaling of key roll call votes in the United States Congress: 1969-74.

FIG. 2. Voting Alignment on Foreign Policy Issues for Nixon Years



Key: Manufacturing Belt Sunbelt Other

Source: Derived from multidimensional scaling of key roll call votes in the United States Congress: 1981-86.

FIG. 3. Voting Alignment on Foreign Policy Issues for Reagan Years

should be interpreted as clusterings of states in a two-dimensional space. Those states (congressional delegations) which agree most often in voting on foreign policy issues are closest to each other in the configurations. Those which disagree most are farthest apart in the space. A closely grouped cluster of states indicates a cohesive voting bloc. State delegations from the manufacturing belt (the Northeast) are depicted in bold typeface. Those from the sunbelt (the Southeast and Southwest) are indicated in italics. States from the Midwest and West are in

regular typeface. State support scores on the Cold War internationalism index described above are used to help interpret the clustering patterns in the configurations. Those state delegations that scored in the top quartile on the index are underlined. Those states in the lowest quartile are in brackets.

A visual examination of the three configurations reveals several things. First, a large proportion of the state delegations cluster at opposite ends of the horizontal axis in each of the figures. The pattern of clustering is loosely bipolar, although it is more well-defined in the Nixon and Reagan years than during the Truman years. Second, it is also apparent that the pattern of interstate alignment has shifted over time and that this change can be characterized in broad regional terms. A comparison of the Truman and Nixon configurations makes this clear. During the Truman years, the pattern of alignment runs along interior-coastal lines. In the Nixon years questions of foreign policy divide the nation along north-south lines. Third, it is evident that there is a great deal of similarity in the pattern of alignment during the Nixon and Reagan presidencies. The north-south cleavage is starker during the Reagan years, but this fault line is already fully evident by the Nixon years. The coastal-interior axis of conflict underlying debates over American foreign policy during the height of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s is a thing of the past.

Like the principal components analysis, the multidimensional scaling analysis points to a realignment in the House voting structure. The principal components analysis suggests that this realignment occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and that the alignment that emerged persisted into the 1980s. The multidimensional scaling analysis offers additional support for this finding, but takes us one step further. It is now clear that this realignment in House voting was regional, and involved a change in the geographic bases of support for Cold War internationalism. A large proportion of the state delegations that make up one of the two voting blocs in the Nixon and Reagan years are from the manufacturing belt. Support for Cold War internationalism is weakest in this bloc. The other voting bloc is heavily populated by congressional delegations from the sunbelt. Support for Cold War internationalism is strongest in this bloc. When the three figures are viewed sequentially, it is evident that the most profound change in policy orientation occurred in the Northeast. The position of state delegations from the South in the three figures appears to be much more consistent.¹¹ The pattern of support in the Midwest and West is much more mixed.

A number of conclusions emerge from the analysis in this section. It is quite clear that whereas the Cold War "consensus" that arose after World War II did span much of the nation, it did not include all parts of the country. The analysis provides support for previous accounts that emphasize regional differences in explaining the foreign policy debates of the 1940s and 1950s, and that define those conflicts along interior-coastal lines (Grassmuck, 1951; Huntington, 1961; Rieselbach, 1966; Turner, 1966; Schurmann, 1974; Chester, 1975; Doenecke, 1979; Eden, 1984). The analysis also indicates that since the Nixon years the regional alignment over foreign policy has remained relatively stable and that the regional breakdown is quite consistent with the popular distinction drawn between the manufacturing belt and the sunbelt.¹² Finally, it is apparent that the regional realignment was driven by rising opposition to Cold War internationalism in the manufacturing belt. It would

¹¹During the Eisenhower and Kennedy years there is more variability in the position of state delegations from the South.

¹²This is partially revealed in the multidimensional scaling analysis. It is also evident in the principal components analysis which shows that the structure of House voting is relatively stable during the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that House voting in both the Nixon and Reagan years was organized along north-south lines suggest that since the Nixon years, the structure of regional competition over foreign policy has not changed very much.

be difficult to explain this realignment without reference to changes that occurred in the 1960s in the Northeast's political agenda, and the various economic, electoral, and ideological forces that shaped it.

Interpretation and Discussion

The preceding analysis provides some support for the conventional wisdom that the Vietnam War eroded the Cold War consensus. The shift in House voting over foreign policy does, generally speaking, coincide with the debate that surfaced in the late 1960s and early 1970s over the costs and legitimacy of the war. Still, there are problems with such an account. To begin with, one must explain why the war produced stark *regional* cleavages over foreign policy. Why was opposition to the war concentrated in the manufacturing belt? There is also the issue of duration. Why did the pattern of regional conflict over foreign policy that surfaced in the 1970s persist into the 1980s, long after the turmoil surrounding the Vietnam War subsided? Finally, there are issues of underdetermination. Any interpretation associated with changes in House voting that crystallized in the 1970s is equally plausible, *provided that it can account for the emergence of a new axis of regional competition*. An interpretation that identifies America's changing geography as the source of the foreign policy realignment is consistent with the data analysis and with a broad literature on regionalism and politics in the United States.

For some time, older centers of industrial production in the Northeast have been losing much of their economic base to other parts of the country (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Agnew, 1987). The remarkable migration of jobs and people from the manufacturing belt to the sunbelt since the 1960s is one indication of the rapid economic growth of the sunbelt. Whereas many states located in the industrial core experienced sluggish growth rates and economic stagnation, many in the South and West became more prosperous and diversified (Norton and Rees, 1979; Keinath, 1985; Wheat, 1986; Smith and Dennis, 1987). The erosion of American commercial power in the international economy has also had uneven consequences. Since the 1960s, larger parts of the manufacturing belt have suffered disproportionately from the decline in sales of heavy industrial goods in world markets, and to a lesser extent from foreign penetration of the domestic market in many key nonagricultural sectors (Glickman and Glasmeier, 1989; Markusen and Carlson, 1989). The manufacturing belt's declining competitiveness is tied to the expansion of American firms overseas and the rise of Western Europe and Japan as industrial competitors. It also reflects the increasing mobility of capital and technological diffusion within the United States.

This process of regional change is as much political as it is economic. With shifts in population have come shifts in political power. The Northeast and Midwest have lost congressional seats to the South and West through reapportionment. At the same time, the regional bases of the national parties have undergone considerable change since the 1960s when the New Deal party system started to come apart at the seams. As liberal Democrats gained greater control over the party's national agenda, they pressed for an end to the Vietnam War and cuts in the military budget. They also pressed for the "nationalization" of civil rights, "right to work" laws, and the social welfare state. When this happened, the party fractured along north-south lines (Sundquist, 1983; Bensel, 1984; Black and Black, 1987). The emergence of this fault line in the Democratic party became increasingly difficult to paper over as a growing number of political organizations (like the Americans for Democratic Action, the AFL-CIO, and later the Northeast-Midwest Institute) exacerbated regional tensions within the party by calling attention to perceived

regional inequities in federal policies and by mobilizing political and economic interests in the manufacturing belt (Gillon, 1987; Markusen, 1987). As a result, the center of the Democratic party began to shift into the Northeast, while the Republican party began to penetrate the once solid Democratic South (Reinhard, 1983; Rae, 1989; Himmelstein, 1990). As party leaders have exploited this new regional cleavage, sectional antagonisms were institutionalized in the party system.

This process of regional restructuring in the United States is complex. It cannot be captured completely in a manufacturing belt/sunbelt model. The current party system is not as regionally polarized as it was in the 1890s. Moreover, as the economic resurgence of New England in the early 1980s and persistence of economic "backwardness" in parts of the South make clear, there are intraregional disparities in economic growth and development. Nevertheless, a two-region model does square with popular political perceptions about America's changing regional landscape. Indeed, for over two decades this view of the nation's regional geography has run like a dark thread through American political discourse. At the center of this debate lies questions of regional equity, and specifically, the issue of purported transfers of economic wealth and power from the manufacturing belt to the sunbelt (Dilger, 1982; Bensel, 1984; Markusen, 1987).¹³ In the domestic arena, the reemergence of sectional strife has colored a broad range of issues, which themselves have changed over time. In most accounts, the 1960s mark the beginning of this process, when regional divisions within the Democratic party found expression in debates over civil rights, entitlement programs, and unionization. By the 1970s the scope of these debates expanded as politicians from these regions locked horns over rising energy costs, capital flight to the sunbelt, and regional bias in federal tax and spending policies. The pattern of conflict between the manufacturing belt and the sunbelt continued through the 1980s, finding expression in a wide variety of issues ranging from "deregulation" to "industrial policy" to the "Reagan deficit."

The struggle between the manufacturing belt and the sunbelt was not limited to domestic policy matters. The widespread belief that the manufacturing belt was paying more in federal taxes than the sunbelt (and receiving less in the way of federal grants and spending) made the war in Vietnam, and more generally, the military budget, an attractive target for criticism on the part of politicians from areas of the country that depended heavily on social welfare subsidies (McCormick, 1989). In an era when much of the Northeast was experiencing hard economic times, political representatives and interest groups from this region saw political advantage in stressing the domestic "opportunity costs"—economic and social—of military intervention, military spending, and military aid. In some cases, northern urban interests, mostly represented by the Democratic party, sought to redistribute military outlays to "labor surplus areas"—i.e., to the manufacturing belt (Bensel, 1984). More often, they tried to trim funding for military policies and programs and to shift federal monies into social welfare accounts. This struggle over military policy continued in the 1980s. Political opposition to the Reagan military buildup was strongest in the manufacturing belt, whereas support was greatest in the South and West (Trubowitz and Roberts, 1992). This conflict clearly reflected partisan and ideological considerations. It also revolved around issues of regional bias in federal spending policies and the opportunity costs of military spending for areas of the country that no longer specialized in military-related production.

¹³This controversy gained notoriety in the mid-1970s with the publication of articles in the *New York Times*, *Business Week*, and the *National Journal* on the regional flow of federal funds. The resulting debate over federal revenue and spending was dubbed the "Second War between the States." For a summary of the issues, see the Advisory Commission on the Intergovernmental Relations (1980).

Similar tensions surfaced in the area of foreign economic policy. The growing vulnerability of many of America's key industrial sectors (e.g., autos, steel, electronics, etc.) to global competition in the 1960s and 1970s further eroded support for free trade in the Northeast. This change also made protectionism a more credible political option in the Northeast (Bensel, 1984). Protectionism was less popular in the South and the West, where labor costs were lower and where a Republican party touting the virtues of "laissez-faire" and a "strong national defense" was gaining electoral strength. These differences in regional comparative advantage and national party strength influenced congressional voting in the 1970s and 1980s over such issues as "trade reform," "domestic content," and "industrial policy" (Sanders, 1986; Wade and Gates, 1990). Here, too, opposition to policies that once enjoyed broad, although by no means universal, support after World War II was centered in the manufacturing belt. The same appears to be true for foreign investment. The rapid expansion of American investment overseas in the 1960s and 1970s penalized areas where a disproportionate share of the nation's unionized work force resided (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). As early as 1970, labor unions like the AFL-CIO and UAW began sending out distress signals, pointing to the consequences of "capital flight" for the nation's traditional manufacturing sectors. In an effort to protect jobs, labor pursued a dual strategy: lobbying for common wage standards at home and tighter controls on the outflow of capital abroad.

The empirical analysis has shown that there was a realignment over foreign policy in the 1960s, and that this realignment was regional in nature. I have interpreted these results to mean that the conflicts that arose over foreign policy in the 1970s were part and parcel of a broader sectional struggle over regional equity and national priorities.

Implications and Conclusions

One of the most distinctive features of American politics is its local or regional nature. This analysis suggests that this is as true for foreign policy as it is traditionally assumed to be for domestic policy. Since the 1970s, debates over foreign policy have been shaped by the conflicting political imperatives of the nation's oldest and newest industrializing regions. Neither the form nor the duration of this conflict can be adequately explained by the turmoil surrounding the Vietnam War. The debates that erupted over Vietnam are better seen as part of a broader regional struggle between the manufacturing belt and the sunbelt over national priorities—a struggle that began in the 1960s and crystallized in the 1970s. Like other eras in American history when consensus over "the national interest" gave way to conflict, issues of foreign policy were defined and debated in terms of their impact on regional growth, stability, and power. Sectionalism is no anachronism. For better or worse, regionalism remains an enduring feature of the politics of American foreign policy making.

This analysis raises a number of issues that are of interest to students of American foreign policy and international relations. One of these concerns is the relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy. Many analysts have highlighted the role that domestic politics plays in foreign policy making, and there are good treatments of the ways in which state structures (Katzenstein, 1978; Krasner, 1978a), bureaucratic politics (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974), and interest groups (Schattschneider, 1935; Pincus, 1977) influence policy making in this domain. What has not been systematically explored by political scientists are the linkages *between* the politics of domestic and foreign policy. These domains are assumed to run on separate tracks, like two trains rushing past each other toward their own

destinations. A regional framework illustrates that political issues in these two domains are more interdependent than is commonly assumed. The domestic alignments that emerge over foreign policy are shaped in fundamental ways by conflicts that are typically assigned to the realm of domestic policy. Politicians attend to the regional consequences of policies and issues, be they foreign or domestic.

A regional perspective also has something to offer work on domestic political responses to international change. Much of this research has defined the relevant societal actors in broad sectoral terms, and stressed the importance of sectorally grounded cleavages in explaining coalition-building and policy conflict (Ferguson, 1984; Gourevitch, 1986; Frieden, 1988; Milner, 1988). One of the virtues of this "second-image reversed" approach is that it highlights the uneven economic effects that changes in America's position in the world economy have within the national economy. This work is less successful in demonstrating how economic interests are aggregated politically at the national level. A geographic model offers advantages in this regard. Despite decades of increased capital mobility, the American economy is still marked by a high degree of sectoral specialization among regions (Glasmeier, 1985; Markusen, 1985; Hall, 1988; Connaughton and Madsen, 1990). As a result, regions also have distinctive and different interests in how the nation responds to international challenges and opportunities. So do political representatives. If for no other reason than winning reelection within spatially defined political units, they must be sensitive to local economic and political circumstances and trends. The mediations between international conditions and domestic responses are to be found at this level, in the political process through which regional interests are represented and articulated by elected officials.

My analysis also sheds new light on problems of coalition-building in the United States today. Many analysts have argued that American leaders' latitude in managing the nation's foreign policy has declined and have attributed this development to the erosion of American power in the international system. They argue that in the 1940s and 1950s, America's ability to absorb the domestic costs of international military and economic competition made it easier for political leaders favoring a bold and expansive role for America in world affairs to mobilize domestic support (Block, 1977; Krasner, 1978b; Rapkin and Avery, 1982). Thus they were able to overcome the obstacles that America's divided constitutional order poses for coherent and consistent national action. As the nation's relative position in the international system deteriorated in the 1960s and 1970s, and as the domestic costs of adverse international trends and challenges increased, conflicts proliferated. For these analysts, the problems American leaders have faced in mobilizing and sustaining domestic support for their foreign policies is one consequence of the decline of American hegemony.

An analysis of the regional bases of competition over American foreign policy since World War II leads to a different interpretation. America's dominant position after World War II may have provided the nation's leaders an opportunity to shape the international system. Yet it was the hegemony of Cold War internationalism at home that enabled American leaders to exercise hegemony abroad. The "autonomy" that national leaders enjoyed in making foreign policy after World War II reflected the dominance of a particular constellation of regional interests at the national level—a coalition that embraced much of the Northeast, the South, and the West. The same logic suggests that the erosion of American leaders' autonomy or political latitude since the 1960s is a consequence of the political divisions that have emerged between the manufacturing belt and the sunbelt. As the costs of the Cold War in the manufacturing belt began to outstrip the benefits, elected officials from these regions saw less virtue in free trade, military spending, and overseas

investment. By contrast, politicians from the sunbelt had less to lose, and much to gain, in continuing to support the Cold War agenda.

American leaders' autonomy in making foreign policy is contingent upon domestic politics. This fundamental fact is obscured by accounts which point to America's international position as the critical variable in explaining the scope of authority that political leaders enjoy in defining "the" national interest. What recedes from view are the domestic struggles that structure the possibilities for coherent and consistent foreign policy. In an era of "divided party government," when regional polarization in the party system is increasing, the problems posed by sectional strife over "the national interest" are more difficult to manage and resolve. As the process of regional restructuring continues, it seems unlikely that political leaders in the 1990s will enjoy great success in coalition-building. Questions of foreign policy will continue to figure prominently in the struggle for regional advantage and power.

References

- ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (1980) *Regional Growth: Historic Perspective*. Washington, DC: ACIR.
- AGNEW, J. (1987) *The United States in the World-Economy: A Regional Geography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ALLISON, G. (1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- ARCHER, C., AND P. TAYLOR (1981) *Section and Party: A Political Geography of American Presidential Elections*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- BEER, S. (1973) The Modernization of American Federalism. *Publius* 3:49-95.
- BENSEL, R. F. (1984) *Sectionalism and American Political Development: 1880-1980*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- BLACK, E., AND M. BLACK (1987) *Politics and Society in the South*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- BLOCK, F. (1977) *The Origins of International Economic Disorder*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- BLUESTONE, B., AND B. HARRISON (1982) *The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment, and the Dismantling of Basic Industry*. New York: Basic Books.
- BRADY, D. (1988) *Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- BURNHAM, W. D. (1981) "The System of 1896: An Analysis." In *The Evolution of American Electoral Systems*, edited by P. Kleppner, pp. 147-202. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- CHESTER, E. W. (1975) *Sectionalism, Politics, and American Diplomacy*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
- CLAUSEN, A. R. (1973) *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- CONNAUGHTON, J. E., AND R. A. MADSEN (1990) The Changing Regional Structure of the U.S. Economy. *Growth and Change* 21:48-60.
- DESTLER, I. M., L. H. GELB, AND A. LAKE (1984) *Our Own Worst Enemy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- DILGER, R. (1982) *The Sunbelt/Snowbelt Controversy: The War over Federal Funds*. New York: New York University Press.
- DOENECKE, J. D. (1979) *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era*. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press.
- DUCHACEK, I. (1970) *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- EASTERLING, D. (1987) "Political Science: Using the General Euclidean Model to Study Ideological Shifts in the U.S. Senate." In *Multidimensional Scaling: History, Theory, and Applications*, edited by F. Young and R. Hamer, pp. 221-256. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- EDEN, L. (1984) "Capitalist Conflict and the State: The Making of United States Military Policy in 1948." In *Statemaking and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory*, edited by C. Bright and S. Harding, pp. 233-261. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- FERGUSON, T. (1984) From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression. *International Organization* 38:41-94.
- FRIEDEN, J. (1988) Sectoral Conflict and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940. *International Organization* 42:59-90.

- GILLON, S. M. (1987) *Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- GLASMEIER, A. K. (1985) "Innovative Manufacturing Industries: Spatial Incidence in the United States." In *High Technology, Space, and Society*, edited by M. Castells, pp. 55-79. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- GLICKMAN, N. J., AND A. K. GLASMEIER (1989) "The International Economy and the American South." In *Deindustrialization and Regional Economic Transformation: The Experience of the United States*, edited by L. Rodwin and H. Sazanami, pp. 60-80. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- GOUREVITCH, P. (1986) *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crisis*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- GRASSMUCK, G. L. (1951) *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- HALL, P. (1988) "Regions in the Transition to the Information Economy." In *America's New Market Geography: Nation, Region and Metropolis*, edited by G. Sternlieb and J. W. Hughes, pp. 137-159. New Brunswick, NJ: Center for Urban Policy Research.
- HALPERIN, M. H. (1974) *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- HIMMELSTEIN, J. L. (1990) *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- HOADLEY, J. (1980) The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789-1803. *American Political Science Review* 74:757-779.
- HOLSTI, O. R., AND J. N. ROSENAU (1984) *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus*. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
- HUNTINGTON, S. P. (1961) *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (1978) "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy." In *Between Power and Plenty*, edited by P. J. Katzenstein. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- KEGLEY, C. W., JR., AND E. R. WITTKOFF (1983) Beyond Consensus: The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy. *International Journal* 38:77-106.
- KEINATH, W. F. (1985) The Spatial Component of the Post-Industrial Society. *Economic Geography* 61:223-240.
- KEY, V. O. (1964) *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- KRASNER, S. (1978a) *Defending the National Interest*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- KRASNER, S. (1978b) "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness." In *Between Power and Plenty*, edited by P. J. Katzenstein, pp. 51-87. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- KRUSKAL, J. B., AND M. WISH (1978) *Multidimensional Scaling*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- LYND, S. (1970) "Beyond Beard." In *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History*, edited by B. J. Bernstein, pp. 46-64. London: Chatto and Windus.
- MACRAE, D., JR. (1970) *Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting*. New York: Harper and Row.
- MCCORMICK, J. M., AND E. R. WITTKOFF (1990) Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988. *Journal of Politics* 52:1077-1100.
- MCCORMICK, T. J. (1989) *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- MARKUSEN, A. R. (1985) *Profit Cycles, Oligopoly, and Regional Development*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- MARKUSEN, A. R. (1987) *Regions: The Economics and Politics of Territory*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
- MARKUSEN, A. R., AND V. CARLSON (1989) "Deindustrialization in the American Midwest: Causes and Responses." In *Deindustrialization and Regional Economic Transformation: The Experience of the United States*, edited by L. Rodwin and H. Sazanami, pp. 29-59. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- MILNER, H. V. (1988) *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- NORTON, R. D., AND J. REES (1979) The Product Cycle and the Spatial Decentralization of American Manufacturing. *Regional Studies* 13:141-151.
- PADDISON, R. (1983) *The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- PINCUS, J. J. (1977) *Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- RABINOWITZ, G. (1975) An Introduction to Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling. *American Journal of Political Science* 19:343-390.

- RABINOWITZ, G., P. GURIAN, AND S. E. MACDONALD (1984) The Structure of Presidential Elections and the Process of Realignment, 1944 to 1980. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:611-635.
- RABINOWITZ, G., AND S. E. MACDONALD (1986) The Power of the States in U.S. Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review* 80:65-87.
- RAE, N. (1989) *The Decline of Liberal Republicans from 1952 to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- RAPKIN, D., AND W. P. AVERY (1982) "America in the World Political Economy: Prognoses, Prescriptions, and Questions for Future Research." In *America in a Changing World Political Economy*, edited by D. Rapkin and W. P. Avery, pp. 227-240. New York: Longman Press.
- REINHARD, D. W. (1983) *The Republican Right Since 1945*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- RIESELBACH, L. N. (1966) *The Roots of Isolationism*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- RYSTAD, G. (1975) *Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy at the Turn of the Century*. Stockholm: Scandinavian University Books.
- SANDERS, E. (1986) "The Regulatory Surge of the 1970s in Historical Perspective." In *Public Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and Policies*, edited by E. E. Bailey, pp. 117-150. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- SCHATTSCHEIDER, E. E. (1935) *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- SCHURMANN, F. (1974) *The Logic of World Power*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- SINCLAIR, B. (1982) *Congressional Realignment 1925-1978*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- SMITH, N., AND W. DENNIS (1987) The Restructuring of Geographical Scale: Coalescence and Fragmentation of the Northern Core Region. *Economic Geography* 63:160-182.
- SUNDQUIST, J. L. (1983) *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- TRUBOWITZ, P., AND B. E. ROBERTS (1992) Regional Interests and the Reagan Military Buildup. Forthcoming in *Regional Studies*.
- TURNER, F. J. (1932) *Sections in American History*. New York: Henry Holt.
- TURNER, J. (1966) *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- VARG, P. A. (1963) *Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers*. Lansing: Michigan State University Press.
- WADE, L. L., AND J. B. GATES (1990) A New Tariff Map of the United States (House of Representatives). *Political Geography Quarterly* 9:284-304.
- WEISBERG, H. F. (1968) *Dimensional Analysis of Legislative Roll Calls*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
- WHEAT, L. F. (1986) The Determinants of 1963-77 Regional Manufacturing Growth: Why the South and West Grow. *Journal of Regional Science* 26:635-659.

Copyright of International Studies Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.